A Third Way to Palestine

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There is another way to empower "Palestine" as an independent nation: Economic empowerment via Fayyad. Read on: JRK

A Third Way to Palestine
Robert Danin
Foreign Affairs (Opinion)
January 1, 2011 - 12:00am



This past September, as Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu sat down in Washington to dine with U.S. President Barack Obama, a barely noticed event took place in Ramallah. With little fanfare, the 13th Palestinian Authority (PA) government, headed by Salam Fayyad, issued its one-year countdown to independence. This brief and understated document is likely to prove far more significant for the future of Palestine than the White House dinner and reflects nothing short of a revolutionary new approach to Palestinian statehood.

For nearly a century, "armed struggle" was the dominant leitmotif of the Palestinian nationalist movement. This strategy was supplemented and ostensibly replaced by peace negotiations after the Oslo accords of 1993. The newest approach, adopted by Prime Minister Fayyad, a U.S.-educated former International Monetary Fund (IMF) economist, signifies the rise of a third and highly pragmatic form of Palestinian nationalism. Fayyad's strategy is one of self-reliance and self-empowerment; his focus is on providing good government, economic opportunity, and law and order for the Palestinians -- and security for Israel by extension -- and so removing whatever pretexts may exist for Israel's continued occupation of the Palestinian territories. Fayyad's aim is to make the process of institution building transformative for Palestinians, thereby instilling a sense that statehood is inevitable. Elegant in its simplicity and seemingly unassailable in its reasonableness, this third way -- dubbed "Fayyadism" by some Western observers -- has nevertheless precipitated serious opposition. Some Palestinians fear Fayyad is only making life better under Israel's occupation, Israelis accuse him of becoming increasingly confrontational, and a growing number of international democracy advocates blame him for Palestinian political paralysis.

Although Fayyadism is not a replacement for a political solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it has become an indispensible component of any future talks. Improving conditions on the ground and giving people a greater stake in running their own lives demonstrate to Palestinians that the peaceful path pays dividends. Fayyadism empowers Palestinian leaders to convince their constituents that it is worthwhile to make the painful compromises that will be necessary for a genuine settlement to be reached. At the same time, more widespread recognition of Palestinian performance on the ground in the realms of security, economic growth, and administration will instill confidence among Israelis that they can hand over control of the occupied territories to a reliable Palestinian partner. Skeptical Israelis tend to wonder: Is Fayyad a partner or an opponent? The reality is that as a Palestinian nationalist, he is both -- although not an enemy.
Should peace negotiations break down, as they have so often in the past, then the Fayyadist enterprise can provide an important safety net for the Palestinians and the Israelis: it can help prevent a complete breakdown in Israeli-Palestinian relations and a possible cascade into violence, as occurred in 2000, when peace talks broke down and there was nothing else in place to revive them. Such a safety net can help keep hope -- and people -- alive.

THE STRUGGLE WITHOUT

Since 1948, the Palestinian nationalist movement has largely been dominated by the "outsiders" -- Palestinians exiled in the Arab world and beyond. The Palestine Liberation Organization was founded in Cairo by the Arab states in 1964 as an umbrella organization for the various Palestinian nationalist groups. Yasir Arafat's Fatah movement soon came to dominate the PLO; its primary objective was to reverse the creation of the Jewish state and return Palestinian refugees to the homes they lost in 1948 by means of armed struggle and terrorism. Some of those Palestinians who had taken refuge from Israel in the West Bank and Gaza used those Palestinian territories, then administered by Jordan and Egypt, respectively, to launch guerrilla raids into Israel.

With Israel's lightning victory in the Six-Day War of 1967, the West Bank and Gaza came under Israel's control. Still, the center of Palestinian political gravity remained with the PLO leaders in exile. These "outsiders" tended to be more absolutist in their objectives, given that they had already paid the price of defeat by Israel, whereas the "insiders" -- those Palestinians residing in Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem -- struggled to protect their homes and patrimony under Israeli occupation.

Insiders launched the first intifada, or uprising, in late 1987, thereby taking the lead in intra-Palestinian politics. The uprising was initiated by a loose coalition associated with Fatah and other nationalist groups, alongside a new Palestinian organization: Hamas. Founded in Gaza, Hamas emerged as an Islamist alternative to Fatah and the PLO and challenged the PLO's exclusive leadership claims inside the occupied territories. Although the PLO leadership based in Tunisia eventually caught up and secured its political primacy, the center of gravity within Palestinian politics had fundamentally shifted to the insiders.

Their first success was in forcing Jordanian King Hussein to relinquish Jordanian claims to the West Bank. The outsiders and their absolutist approach were further weakened when the PLO backed Saddam Hussein's 1990 invasion of Kuwait. After the 1993 Oslo accords, the PLO moved toward conciliation and recognized Israel and its right to exist. Israel, in turn, recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people. Arafat returned from exile, and the PLO outsiders and insiders were suddenly and uneasily reunited in the West Bank and Gaza. Hamas remained largely outside Palestinian politics as an Islamist social movement with a small, and violent, terrorist wing.

The Oslo accords and the self-rule they initiated by creating the PA were meant to end the era of armed struggle and terrorism. Negotiations with Israel and the establishment of Palestinian institutions, so the logic went, would lead to a final peace accord between Israel and the PLO. For a time, it seemed to be working. Israel granted the Palestinians limited control over portions of the West Bank and Gaza, Hamas was weak, and the two sides attempted to negotiate a final settlement to end the conflict. But that hope was short-lived. Rather than serving to build confidence, the post-Oslo period only increased bitterness and mistrust. Palestinians either engaged in or turned a blind eye to terrorism, and incitement to violence continued. Meanwhile, Israel continued to expand the West Bank settlements and failed to carry out previously negotiated troop redeployments from the West Bank.

By the autumn of 2000, the road to peace no longer seemed so clear. The first intifada, in 1987, had been waged largely with stones and Molotov cocktails; the second one, which began in September 2000, relied on higher-tech weapons and, increasingly, suicide terrorist attacks. Palestinian security officers who until then had worked closely with their Israeli counterparts turned their weapons on the Israelis. Israel, in turn, attacked PA institutions and reoccupied some parts of the West Bank from which it had earlier withdrawn. Oslo seemed to be unraveling. Armed struggle, it turned out, had not been abandoned after all; Arafat had simply chosen to harness violence to supplement negotiations.

During the second intifada, the nationalist Fatah camp was outflanked by Hamas' more militant approach and its absolute rejection of Israel. Ultimately, Israel succeeded militarily in bringing the second intifada to a halt, largely by reoccupying the West Bank and then building a separation barrier to keep Palestinians out of Israel. Yet this did not kill the resistance impulse. Its mantle had been largely taken up by Hamas; other religious militant groups, such as Palestinian Islamic Jihad; and radical elements in Fatah, such as the al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, all of whom continued to reject the principle of nonviolence, even though by 2003 Israel had severely limited those Palestinians' ability to conduct terrorist attacks.

Arafat died in November 2004; two months later, Abbas was elected as the second PA president. Abbas' victory ushered in a new era, with a clear Palestinian commitment to peaceful negotiations. Israelis welcomed his unambiguous renunciation of all violence, but Abbas' approach was not universally embraced by all Palestinians. Some had lost faith in the Oslo-era paradigm of negotiations as the path to statehood. Abbas' party, Fatah, lost the January 2006 parliamentary elections to Hamas by a slim margin in what was largely a protest vote against Fatah corruption and sclerosis. Hamas formed a new PA government and took power for the first time. Subsequent outside efforts to moderate the organization, such as the February 2007 Mecca accord, which produced a Hamas-Fatah unity government, failed to convince Hamas to renounce violence and terrorism.

THE LONELY REFORMER

Under the Hamas-Fatah unity government, intra-Palestinian tensions mounted over who retained control of the security forces, eventually leading Hamas to go on the offensive in Gaza. After its fighters violently took over the Gaza Strip in June 2007 and ejected the Fatah-dominated PA security forces, Abbas dissolved the national unity government and appointed the PA's long-standing finance minister, Fayyad, an independent and an insider from the West Bank, to form a new PA government. The PA retained control of the West Bank, and Hamas became the de facto authority in Gaza, even though the PA still continues to pay the salaries of tens of thousands of employees there. The PA, severely wounded by Israel during the second intifada and then by Hamas in the 2006 legislative elections, was now placed in the hands of a little-known political independent.

As Arafat's finance minister, Fayyad had won domestic and international acclaim for introducing transparency and accountability to the PA. With Fayyad at the helm, the PA initially set forth an extremely modest reform and development agenda. The goal was to provide basic services and pay the salaries of civil servants in the West Bank and Gaza while encouraging fiscal discipline. The PA's systematic two-year development plan, presented at an international donors' conference for the Palestinian territories held in December 2007 in Paris, called on Israel, the Palestinians, and the international community to work together to create an environment conducive to Palestinian reform. It was, in short, a plan for good governance and improving the investment climate. The international community pledged more than $7.7 billion, although some Arab states have yet to make good on their promises.

In early 2008, Israel and Fayyad's PA government agreed to work to improve living conditions in the West Bank. A new Palestinian effort, encouraged by the United States and Tony Blair, the official envoy of the Quartet (the European Union, the UN, the United States, and Russia), aimed to bring about rapid change and to increase PA control on the ground. Slowly, over the next year, Israel allowed PA forces to deploy and retake control of limited areas, and then increasingly more West Bank towns, using newly trained officers. This approach was also meant to help generate support for the PA and the peace negotiations then under way between President Abbas and then Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert.

The PA also intensified its economic efforts with hundreds of development projects supported by the international community. At the Quartet's prodding, some Israeli physical barriers to movement -- both within the West Bank and between it and Israel -- were eased or removed beginning in the second half of 2008 and then more seriously in 2009, precipitating a much-hoped-for economic boost by allowing trade to flourish. Palestinian forces deployed professionally and effectively, retaking areas that had descended into chaos and militia control. This joint approach was quietly expanded to other parts of the West Bank, with similarly encouraging results. The city of Nablus and its environs, which had been a hotbed of some of the worst intifada violence and terrorism, became increasingly prosperous and safe. Yet Fayyad was and still remains frustrated by Israel's frequent military incursions into Palestinian population centers, which undermine PA credibility and the growing sense that Palestinians are regaining control of their own lives. The Palestinians were indeed beginning to prosper. But without there being a real sense of retaking control, the economic benefit could not translate into political recognition of that change.

A THIRD PATH

In August 2009, strengthened by a cabinet reshuffle, Fayyad adopted a more radical and audacious program. It aimed at nothing short of ending the occupation and achieving statehood within two years. Fayyad enumerated, ministry by ministry, the steps the government would take to prepare the Palestinian territories for that goal.

By announcing an ambitious two-year deadline for statehood, Fayyad reintroduced the timeline that had fallen by the wayside. The Oslo accords had aimed to reach a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by 1999; once that deadline lapsed, the Palestinians lost confidence in the idea of independence. The Quartet's 2003 "road map" had set 2005 as the date for Palestinian statehood, although by then, the Palestinians believed it would never happen. By setting his own goal, Fayyad sought to motivate his constituents and signal to Israel that the Palestinians were unhappy with the sense of drift. The year of decision would be 2011.

Fayyad replaced reform and minor technocratic goals with bold, revolutionary aspirations. As he put it in the PA government's August 2009 program, he sought "to complete the process of building institutions of the independent State of Palestine in order to establish a de facto state apparatus within the next two years." The PA pledged to finalize the creation of central and local institutions, upgrade the delivery of government services, and launch infrastructure projects. Fayyad also issued a bold call for self-reliance: "Hard work, coupled with faith in our ability to create new realities on the ground, will clear our path to freedom. Through our strength of will and building on the foundations of our achievements we can end the occupation and establish the independent and sovereign state of Palestine." This marked a dramatic departure both from the old model of armed struggle and from the modest goals Fayyad had articulated just 18 months earlier, which focused on working with Israel to create conditions conducive to reform.
Fayyadism represents, above all, a fundamental attitudinal shift. Its emphasis on self-reliance is a conscious effort to change the role of the Palestinians in their narrative from that of victims to that of agents of their own fate. It is a vision for the future and an implicit critique of the Palestinian national movement's long-standing fixation on the past. It strives to replace cynicism and hopelessness, rampant among Palestinians, who have repeatedly seen their dreams squelched, with reasons for hope. The process itself is transformational: as the situation on the ground improves and the PA delivers increasing economic prosperity and security for the Palestinians and, ultimately, for Israel, the PA will provide a sense of possibility where one has been sorely lacking. Finally, Fayyadism repudiates the use of violence -- a tactic that was long central to Palestinian nationalism and still has widespread resonance in Palestinian society.
This approach has the power to change the way that Israelis regard their Palestinian neighbors. In the past two years, the Israeli security establishment has dramatically shifted its view of Palestinian institutions and capabilities. When Fayyad first embarked on his reforms, most Israeli experts deemed his plans unrealistic. Yet slowly, grudgingly, and with increased respect, key Israelis from the military and intelligence services have recognized that the Palestinians are functioning effectively in the realms of governance, economic development, and, most important to Israel, security.

Since 2007, the West Bank economy has taken off. Official IMF figures place growth in the West Bank at 8.5 percent for 2009, with the first part of 2010 registering over 11 percent growth. Government spending has remained within budgetary targets, and improved tax collection rates have resulted in higher than projected domestic tax revenues. Indeed, in the first half of 2010, tax revenues were 15 percent above budgetary projections. Unemployment, close to 20 percent in 2008, has been reduced by nearly a third. More than 120 schools were built over the past two years, 1,100 miles of road laid, and 900 miles of new water networks established. In the past year alone, 11 new health clinics were built and 30 more were expanded in the West Bank.
To even the casual observer, it is clear that the PA's efforts over the past two years have had a dramatic effect in the West Bank. Ramallah is booming. Hebron, Jenin, Nablus, and other cities that were once no-go areas are now safe and bustling at all hours. Renegade militiamen no longer walk the streets with impunity; they have either been imprisoned, been driven underground, or been granted amnesty as a result of a 2007 deal with Israel. Now, uniformed Palestinian police officers keep the peace, with six battalions recently trained by U.S. forces deployed throughout the West Bank. Such actions were prescribed by the road map, which outlined the path to a two-state solution.

The Palestinian security services under Arafat had become so unwieldy, with more than a dozen competing armed organizations, that a dramatic reform effort was necessary to make them efficient and accountable. Thus, the road map explicitly called on the PA to rebuild and consolidate the Palestinian forces, with U.S. assistance, into three main bodies reporting to a newly empowered interior minister. Providing law and order, dismantling terrorist organizations, and cooperating with Israel were all identified and endorsed by the international community as steps required for real progress toward Palestinian statehood.

Fayyad's goal was to create the necessary conditions so that the Palestinians would be prepared for de facto statehood by 2011. From an economic and institutional standpoint, that goal has already been achieved, at least according to the World Bank. Its most recent monitoring report of Palestinian institutions concluded in September 2010 that "if the PA maintains its current performance in institution-building and delivery of public services, it is well positioned for the establishment of a state at any point in the near future."

Not surprisingly, Fayyad's efforts have generated public support and boosted his job-approval ratings. This is due partly to his tireless approach of taking his campaign to the streets and to areas of the West Bank that other politicians avoid -- a strategy that has generated support among the politically unaffiliated majority, who see the dominant Fatah Party as hopelessly corrupt and Hamas' vision as frighteningly reactionary. Yet Fayyad has not translated this support into any meaningful political organization. He remains genuinely politically independent, with no formal political base or organizational structure. Hence, one of Fayyadism's greatest challenges lies in translating this one-man phenomenon into something more systematic than just the vision Fayyad espouses.

IF YOU BUILD IT, WILL INDEPENDENCE COME?

With such a bold departure from past traditions, it is no surprise that Fayyadism has generated a significant backlash from within the Palestinian polity and even from some supporters of the Palestinian cause abroad. By attempting to build institutions of a state while under occupation, cooperating with the Israelis, and behaving as if Palestine were a state, Fayyad is seen by many as having abandoned the traditional liberation theology of the Palestinian national movement. Moreover, by establishing an alternative basis for legitimacy -- competence and results -- in a society in which legitimacy has traditionally derived from leadership in the armed struggle, Fayyad is asking the public to take a leap of faith. Many fear that in doing so, he is ceding sacred ground to Hamas. It is not yet obvious to many Palestinians that competent institutions will help them achieve statehood.

Fayyad's critics fear that although he has embarked on a noble venture, his approach is naive and potentially politically suicidal. They argue that by focusing on changes on the ground, Fayyad is ignoring the fundamental nature of the occupation, which they say must be addressed at a political level. They fear that however good his intentions, the reformist project will fail because they believe the overwhelming weight of Israel's occupation will never allow the Palestinians to succeed. Improving conditions in the West Bank, they argue, is a palliative remedy that serves Israeli interests by lightening the burden of Israel's military occupation. Yet Fayyad seeks to move away from the zero-sum thinking that suggests that anything that could possibly benefit the Palestinians should be bad for Israel, and vice versa. Instead, he argues that improving the lives and security of Palestinians also serves to build trust and cooperation with the country he seeks as a future Palestine's peaceful neighbor.

A second criticism leveled at Fayyad is that rather than supporting President Abbas in political negotiations, Fayyad is undermining the PA's effort to secure the entirety of the West Bank and East Jerusalem. They fear that Fayyad is setting up the PA to accept Phase 2 of the road map, which calls for a Palestinian state with provisional borders, the final disposition of which would be negotiated between the embryonic Palestinian state and Israel. Many Palestinians worry that Israel might then simply recognize Palestine in the 40 percent of the West Bank that currently falls outside of exclusive Israeli jurisdiction. The existential dispute between the Israelis and the Palestinians could then be rendered a territorial dispute, leaving Israel with the upper hand. At that point, critics argue, the international community would lose interest and declare the dispute largely resolved, with some territorial claims outstanding. This concern is largely unfounded, however, given that Fayyad has repeatedly and unequivocally argued that Palestine must include the entirety of the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem, with the 1967 armistice line as its border.

Fayyad's approach also challenges some of the deeply entrenched corruption that remains in Palestinian society. For a small yet influential group of Palestinians, Fayyad's reforms pose a direct threat. By instituting a transparent and accountable salary-payment mechanism in the Finance Ministry during Arafat's rule, Fayyad opened the taps for significantly greater foreign financial support to the Palestinians, but in doing so, he also robbed some of the traditional business elites of the money that allowed them to maintain their patronage networks. As prime minister, Fayyad has resisted relinquishing control over the Finance Ministry, lest it become a source of funding for unauthorized party activity. This has pitted him against some of the Fatah stalwarts, already resentful of Fayyad for his popularity and independence, who are keen to gain access to the PA coffers. So strong are the vested interests of some within Fatah that they would rather see Fayyad fail, and the Palestinian enterprise suffer, than see him succeed and endanger their long-standing economic interests.

Hamas leaders are also opposed to Fayyad, and not only because the PA refuses to grant them a seat in the government so long as Hamas occupies Gaza and refuses to surrender to the PA's monopoly of force. For years, Hamas actually respected Fayyad's willingness to challenge Fatah corruption and quietly backed his clean-government approach. This dovetailed well with Hamas' early efforts to challenge corruption -- at least when they were in the opposition. But now, Fayyad is working to ensure that there is only one security force deployed on the West Bank's streets -- the PA's -- and to prevent all forms of violence. Consequently, Hamas has become an opponent.
The PA security services have been accused of heavy-handedness in their treatment of Hamas in the West Bank. After the death of an incarcerated suspected Hamas member in June 2009, the PA took steps to avoid future similar incidents, such as issuing orders forbidding physical and psychological punishment and disciplining the officers involved in the affair. In September 2009, Fayyad ordered security commanders to halt the mistreatment of prisoners; 43 officers were demoted, jailed, or fired for abusing prisoners. Hamas legislators and human rights researchers confirmed that the PA forces ceased torturing prisoners. Al-Haq, one of the leading Palestinian human rights organizations, wrote to Fayyad in February of last year and noted his "honest approach toward establishing legitimacy and the rule of law." Fayyad's most recent government guidelines contain extensive plans for strengthening the justice system, including building a penal system that "unfailingly respects human rights," upgrading law enforcement capacity, and encouraging civil society to publicly report on the performance of public institutions in relation to human rights.

Fayyad has also been criticized for the lack of effective checks and balances in Palestinian governing institutions. This critique is valid but misplaced. The blame rests not with the Fayyad administration but with the dysfunctional status quo, brought about largely by Hamas' violent takeover of Gaza, in which the PA was violently driven out. Indeed, today a quorum cannot convene for the Palestinian Legislative Council. Nor does there seem to be a great impetus for this to happen, either from Hamas, which enjoys the monopoly it exercises over Gaza, or within Fatah, which only has minority status within the PLC. The Fatah-Hamas stalemate can only be resolved in one of three ways: through true reconciliation, such as by means of the effort sponsored by Egypt over the past few years; through new elections that produce a decisive victory that the other cannot ignore; or by one side's ousting the other and taking control of the territory it currently does not govern.

THE ROAD TO STATEHOOD

Fayyadism aspires to bring the PA to the gates of statehood, but it does not clearly articulate how the Palestinians will then cross that threshold. Ideally, negotiations with Israel will hasten that outcome. Fayyad's focus is on preparing the groundwork so that all obstacles to independence are removed.

However much progress has been made, the Fayyadist experiment could still unravel. The bolt from the blue remains one of the defining hallmarks of the Holy Land, and any number of sudden or undesirable developments could end the Fayyadist experiment. Unanticipated violence, precipitated by dashed political expectations, could reverse many of the gains, just as the eruption of the second intifada did in 2000. Conversely, Fayyadism's success could precipitate violence by renegade Palestinians or Israelis who seek to foil Fayyad's aspirations. His efforts could also be undermined by political developments, such as a radical shakeup that ends the uneasy political marriage between Abbas and his prime minister, a Fatah-Hamas reconciliation agreement that renders Fayyadism a casualty, or Israeli reluctance to cede greater control to the PA. Fayyadism is a bicycle that must either pedal on or fall over from a lack of forward momentum.
The political divide between the physically disconnected West Bank and Gaza also must be bridged if Palestinian statehood is to be realized. Unless Hamas lays down its weapons or relinquishes absolute control of Gaza, a unified Palestinian state is not likely. Israel's attempts to isolate Gaza and squeeze it materially have not produced a popular uprising against Hamas rule, nor will it. Hamas' military lock on Gaza is too strong, despite its lack of real popular support there (polls consistently show Hamas' popularity ratings in Gaza to be between 20 percent and 25 percent). And as the 2009 Operation Cast Lead demonstrated, although Israel is willing to use devastating firepower to weaken Hamas, it is not willing -- nor is Egypt -- to use military force to completely extricate Hamas from Gaza. Instead, a general consensus exists that Palestinian political reconciliation is the only option. Yet Hamas is comfortably entrenched in Gaza, as is the PA in the West Bank, and neither is willing to make the fundamental concessions required for real unity.

The stronger the Fayyad government becomes, and the more it delivers results to the people, the better placed the PA will be to extract concessions from Hamas, especially if the only thing holding up an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement is Hamas' political opposition. PA leaders calculate that progress in the negotiations and ultimately a credible peace deal with Israel could be put to a popular referendum, thereby placing Hamas in the unenviable position of becoming the spoiler of Palestinian statehood; Hamas wants to ensure that a deal is not reached so that it will not be placed in that position.

The only other alternative would be a three-state solution -- a Hamas-controlled state in Gaza, a Fatah-controlled state in the West Bank, and Israel sandwiched in between. Indeed, there are some Israelis and even some Palestinians who see merit to such an outcome. Fayyad, however, has categorically rejected three states as an unacceptable solution, arguing that if the political split between the West Bank and Gaza is not resolved, then there cannot be a Palestinian state.

FROM CONFLICT TO COOPERATION

In the meantime, much more can be done -- by the Palestinians, by Israel, and by the international community -- to strengthen the Fayyadist endeavor. For its part, Israel should suspend its ambivalence about Fayyad and recognize that this is a historic opportunity -- he and Abbas are the best Palestinian partners Israel is ever likely to find. This partnership does not require affection, just a businesslike calculation of self-interest.

For a long time, Israelis in the national security establishment dismissed Fayyad as affable but not strong and were therefore reluctant to do anything to help him. Now, they recognize the seriousness and strength of his efforts but are not quite sure how to react. Fayyad has taken steps in the past few years that have made him increasingly suspect in the eyes of Israelis. He has appealed to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to block Israel's membership in the body, waged a campaign to boycott goods produced in Israeli settlements, written letters to members of the European Union urging them not to upgrade the EU's relationship with Israel under the European Neighborhood Policy, and participated in the weekly peaceful demonstrations against the barrier Israel has erected to separate it from the Palestinians.

Israel's concern is understandable, given that Fayyad is asking the Israelis to entrust him with more power. Some of the steps that Fayyad has taken to confront Israel internationally may actually be politically counterproductive, in that they push away some of the very Israelis he seeks to engage. Although he has tried to rectify this by explaining his approach directly to Israeli audiences, his message has not resonated widely in Israel. Those who understand his need to balance domestic political concerns with cooperation with Israel have not been very vocal. But the Israelis should recognize that Fayyad's commitment to nonviolence is unequivocal and that he has taken political and personal risks at home to pursue peaceful reconciliation.
Israel can help Fayyad with security, especially in the West Bank areas in which Palestinians are still prevented from exercising control. Ultimately, for Fayyad to convince the Israelis that a Palestinian state is an asset and not a threat, he will need to demonstrate that the Palestinians can deliver effective security throughout the West Bank and are able to prevent Hamas from taking over. At the moment, the PA is still prevented from operating in vast areas of the West Bank, and the Israel Defense Forces still conduct visible operations in areas that previous agreements gave over to Palestinian control. These incursions, more than any other Israeli action, discredit Fayyad and the PA in the eyes of Palestinians and undermine the motivation of the Palestinian security services. Greater coordination between Israel and the PA could help minimize or eliminate these incursions and allow the Palestinians to expand their operations effectively into West Bank territory today controlled by Israel. This would be consistent with the IDF's recurrent pledge that the more the Palestinians do in terms of security in the West Bank, the less Israel will do.

Second, Israel needs the PA to play a role within "Area C" -- the 60 percent of contiguous West Bank territory still under exclusive Israeli control. PA efforts there are critical for sustainable economic development and for private-sector investment. To date, Palestinian construction and development is forbidden by Israel in 70 percent of Area C, and in the remaining 30 percent, it is nearly impossible for Palestinians to obtain the required permission to build or repair infrastructure.

Israel should allow the PA to implement development projects and access its land and resources. In addition, Israel should reinstate the moratorium on demolishing Palestinian structures that it adopted for five months in 2008 and halt further expropriations of land in these areas. Including Palestinians in planning and zoning in Area C, especially in Palestinian-populated areas, and facilitating access to the Jordan Valley would send a powerful signal that Israel is serious about its commitment to a two-state solution. It is also one of the most important steps Israel can take to allow the Palestinians to create a sense of a state in the making.
All of this will require greater Palestinian operational coordination with Israel to supplement the political negotiations. To date, that coordination has been insufficient. Israel and the PA meet on an ad hoc basis or through third parties. Left to their own devices, Israel and the PA will not likely establish the necessary coordination mechanisms. Thus, the international community needs to make the issues pertaining to Area C and security cooperation part of ongoing high-level negotiations or establish a systematic and ongoing trilateral mechanism to bring together the Palestinian prime minister and the Israeli defense minister, given that the Israeli military still exercises jurisdiction over the occupied territories.

Although the international community has played an important role in providing financial support to the PA, it has not always put its mouth where its money is. The United States, as the overseer of Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking, has tended to focus its high-level attention on negotiations, while leaving subordinates to do the important work on the ground to support Palestinian state building. Focusing more political attention on the ground-up approach would help strengthen Fayyad's position among Palestinians, encourage Israel to invest more political capital in the state-building effort, and ultimately increase the chances that final-status negotiations will succeed.

Fayyadism alone will not resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Only an agreement accepted by the Israelis and the Palestinians can do that. But Fayyadism is helping support that effort and preparing the groundwork for peace and Palestinian statehood in a way that negotiations alone or armed struggle never could.

ROBERT M. DANIN is Eni Enrico Mattei Senior Fellow for Middle East and Africa Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. He headed the Jerusalem mission of Quartet Representative Tony Blair from April 2008 to June 2010 and served as U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs from 2005 to 2008 and Director for the Levant and Israeli-Palestinian Affairs at the U.S. National Security Council from 2003 to 2005.

FPI 2011 Manifesto

FPI (Friends of Palestinians and Israelis)

The New Year, 2011 (John R. Kleinheksel Sr)

The New Year is a time for reassessment, re-energizing, retooling, and setting forth a vision for the future of our little movement, FPI. (Remember my Christmas Eve message? At least one FPI-Holland member thought it too “one-sided”).

The first draft of my New Year’s Eve message turned out to be an angry rant against Jewish and Christian “Zionism”, so I re-wrote it. In this re-write, I’m going to give place to (1) Jeff Halper (Director of the Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions-ICAHD), who has just published what I believe to be compelling, guiding principles to resolve the present impasse. Then, (2) as a “person of faith” (a follower of Jesus, actually), I want to cast a vision of love as the only antidote to indifference, anger and “hatred” that is the real “enemy” to be overcome. Finally, (3) as an illustration of the “way forward”, I will cite how one Palestinian builder in the West Bank (Palestinian territory) is using Israeli companies (suppliers) to get things done (independent of the “peace process”).

I A “JEWISH” VISION FOR RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUES (JEFF HALPER)
Jeff Halper, Director of ICAHD, has suggestions for “how the conflict can be resolved” in his paper “Palestine, 2011”. They are worth repeating here.
. . . .[H]ow can the conflict be resolved? – is also easily answerable. I don’t mean entering into the one state/two state conundrum and deciding which option [is] best. Under certain circumstances both could work, and I can think of at least 3 or 4 other viable options as well, including my favorite, a Middle Eastern economic confederation. The Palestinian think tank Passia published a collection of twelve proposed solutions a few years ago. (I)t is not difficult to identify the essential elements of any solution. They are, in brief,

• A just, workable and lasting peace must be inclusive of the two peoples living in Palestine/Israel;

• Any solution must provide for a national expression of each people, which mitigates against one democratic state based on one person-one vote;

• It must provide economic viability to all the parties;

• No solution will work that is not based on human rights, international law and UN resolutions.

• The refugee issue, based on the right of return, must be addressed squarely.

• A workable peace must be regional in scope; it cannot be confined merely to Israel/Palestine; and

• A just peace must address the security concerns of all the parties and countries in the region.

Even though he doesn’t want to debate it, he clearly prefers a “two-state” solution. Israel has always insisted on its own “Jewish” (majority) state rather than a truly pluralistic, democratic state (one person, one vote). From the beginning, Palestinians have been deliberately and systematically dispossessed of “their land”. Yet we are all supposed to be working toward a two-state solution: two peoples, each with their own autonomy, living side by side. We’re still a long way away from that.

II A “CHRISTIAN” VISION FOR MOVING FORWARD (YOURS TRULY) The “peace process” stagnates because of entrenched attitudes. Each fears “the other” wants the whole enchilada. Israelis have a wary acceptance of the status quo (violence is “down” lately according to Shin Bet). Palestinians (for good reason) fear Israel wants total control. Both have a deep-seated anger against injustices perpetrated against them for at least 60 years and a settled conviction that the “other side” is intransigent and shares the most blame.

Muslims, Jews and Christians have suffered much through the centuries. “Persecution” continues to this very day, as mosques, synagogues and churches are bombed and violated. “People of faith” want to be validated, not violated. We become very defensive when someone appears to be imposing their religious views on us. “People of faith” should lead the way in showing respect to “the other”, taking the time to listen to personal accounts of faith journeys. We must find ways of being true to our “faith” while honoring the “faith” of others. Instead of adding to the divisions, we should show the way to new kinds of diversity and community in the midst of true differences. Responsible Muslims, Jews and Christians are now doing this, but we don’t hear enough about it.

The only antidote to indifference or “hatred” is love, the ability to care about someone else. Love is the only thing that can exorcise hate. It isn’t all that rare, even in Israel/Palestine, if the media would only give us more of the examples of people caring for people, living alongside each other. (The “Separation Barrier” is just that, enforcing isolation and separation between peoples!) I’ve been trying, especially lately, to give you more examples of Israelis and Palestinians overcoming barriers. People of faith declare that “God” is the inexhaustible Source of love. But we need to drink deeply from this well for us to be able to irrigate and nourish the dry, desolate desert of our time and place.
You will not be surprised to have me state my firm conviction that the “way” Jesus taught, lived and died for, (active, nonviolent resistance to wrong) is the “road map” out of the present morass. Jesus cared for the marginalized among his own people and enemies (like the Synagogue leader and the Roman military captain), caring for people in the surrounding “Gentile” territories. He broke through commonly accepted social, economic, political, religious and ethical barriers that kept people apart. (Ask for my paper on Jesus Transcends All Barriers).
At a crucial point in his ministry, he made a bold claim that if “anyone” accepted him and actually lived “his” way, then out of that person’s life would flow acts of justice and mercy that would water the desolate landscape and bring life out of death (John 7:37, 38). This is not a cheap ticket. As Dietrich BonhÖffer put it, When Jesus calls a person, he bids him come with him and die (paraphrase). As Paul put it in much of his correspondence, it’s being crucified with Jesus, dying to self, and being alive to “the other”; to “God” (the Great Other) and the neighbor (anyone in need).

The last words written in the “Christian” scriptures repeat the invitation to “anyone” to drink deeply from this life-giving “way” and be part of the “healing of the nations” (Rev. 22:1, 2, 17, echoing Psalm 63:1 - 5 and Isaiah 55: 1 - 7).

III AN EXAMPLE OF THE WAY FORWARD (BASHAR MASRI) I’m convinced we cannot look to “politicians” for leadership. They are taillights, not headlights, only followers of the cultural mores of their constituents. That is why WE have to make the changes on the ground for the politicians to take notice and begin instituting changes already happening. FPI will be part of a growing grass roots movement, actually many streams that are slowly coalescing, soon to overflow the banks. More and more people are breaking up hard-pack ground, watering newly plowed fields, planting seeds of mutual respect, watering relationships with acts of kindness and deeds of justice. (Our Catherine Deyo is applying to return to Palestine this summer to work among those quietly bringing about change).

A few days ago Doug Dicks (our liaison in the field), brought to light an AP news story that I want to share this New Year. Some background information is needed for the story to make sense. The Palestinians are now enforcing a “boycott” against Palestinians purchasing any products or services that originate from Israeli settlements in the West Bank (that part of the land they claim as their own).

Here’s the story:
Israeli companies to help build Palestinian city
By MOHAMMED DARAGHMEH, Associated Press
RAMALLAH, West Bank – About 20 Israeli suppliers will help build the first modern Palestinian city in the West Bank but only after promising they will not use products or services from Israeli settlements, the project's developer said Tuesday.
The announcement angered the Jewish settlers, who accused the suppliers of caving in to an international boycott of settlement goods and businesses.
The West Bank city of Rawabi, going up 20 miles (30 kilometers) north of Jerusalem, is a key part of Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad's plans to lay the groundwork for a future Palestinian state, regardless of progress in peace talks.
The participation of Israeli companies in its construction is both an ironic twist on the heavy use of Palestinian laborers in building Jewish settlements in the West Bank, and a powerful reminder of how much the 43 years of Israeli occupation have made the Palestinian economy reliant on Israel.

Project developer Bashar Masri told The Associated Press that he tries to use Palestinian suppliers whenever possible. But when necessary, he turns to Israeli firms on condition that products and services from any territories Israel captured in the 1967 Mideast war — the West Bank, east Jerusalem and the Golan Heights — are not used.

This is a simple example of how Palestinians and Israelis are working together to bring about change. Change is inevitable. It has happened. It is happening. It will happen. Not all change is for the better. But in it all we must pray and work (ora et labora) that it will be peaceful (evolutionary) change and not cataclysmic (violent) change.

There is such fear, such distrust, leading to deeper entrenchment in failed positions. There is “fear” that if the tide swings “in favor of” the Palestinian position, all hell will break loose and Palestinian “extremists” will wreck vengeance on Israel. Each side accuses the other of the rage, hatred and violence it refuses to see in its own heart and life.

Let’s be candid. This is often what happens in revolutions. The new powers-that-be beat up on the former authorities and inflict new oppression on what’s left of the country. No one wants this to happen, least of all me. It doesn’t have to happen that way!

FPI is working with organizations seeking to avoid such conflagration who are working to bring about peaceful change. This has happened (not without difficulty) in Ireland, South Africa, and Eastern European nations following the collapse of the Soviet Republic, to name only the obvious ones. Perpetuating the existing realities on the ground (land confiscation, home demolition, orchards uprooted, Bantustan existence enforced by the “Separation Wall”), is a “No Exit” position that will blow up in everybody’s faces.

We need to ask the White House and our representatives in Congress to listen to J Street, Americans for Peace Now, B’tsalem, Jewish Voice for Peace, The Israeli Committee Against Home Demolition (ICOHD), Combatants for Peace, The Parents Family Circle, End the Occupation, and many others, as well as The American-Israeli Political Action Committee –(AIPAC) and their Christian Zionist advocates. And these are only the Jewish – based ones here in the US. There are many other Christian Palestinian – based groups that are also working to break down entrenched barriers (SABEEL, Musalaha, the Mar Elias Schools, Seeds of Peace, and The Holy Land Trust, to name only a few).

In my view, we have to stop demonizing “the other”, claiming implacable “hatred” as an excuse to continue failed policies of the past. Heaven help us validate each other’s existence and find room in our hearts for “the other”. To paraphrase Martin Luther King Jr., If we keep taking an eye for an eye, the whole world soon will become blind.

'Twas the Night Before Christmas!

Dear Friend on the Day before Christmas,
Do you remember when there was no room for Joseph and Mary and a child on the way?

It's happening again . . . .and again, in the West Bank. Tonight and almost every night during 2010. Read on (with thanks to Noushin Framke for this UN post).

And my commentary and Christmas greeting to you is below the article . . . with much appreciation to you for your patience and willingness to receive these posts, JRK

United Nations
Nations
Statement on the increase in house demolitions in the West Bank and East Jerusalem
by Mr Maxwell Gaylard, the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator for the occupied Palestinian territory
22nd December 2010
For Immediate Release:


http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/house_demolition_23_12_2010_press_release_english.pdf


Earlier today Maxwell Gaylard, the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator for the occupied Palestinian territory, visited the site of a Palestinian home which had been demolished just twenty four hours earlier, following an order by the relevant authorities of the Government of Israel.


Mr Gaylard visited and spoke with the families affected in the Ras Al Amud neighbourhood of East Jerusalem. This particular demolition resulted in the displacement of thirteen people, all registered refugees, including four children.


In a statement Mr Gaylard said, "the destruction of this home and the displacement of these people raises serious concerns with regard to Israel’s obligations under international law.”


Along with this incident in Ras Al Amud there have been two further demolitions, in Sur Baher in East Jerusalem, and the village of Nu'man near Jerusalem. These incidents are a manifestation of the increase in such demolitions in 2010, during which 396 Palestinian structures were demolished in East Jerusalem and other areas under full Israeli control in the West Bank. This compares to 275 in the previous year – an increase of almost 45 %. As a result this year, 561 people have been displaced, including 280 children, and the livelihoods of over 3,000 people have also been affected.


“These actions have a severe social and economic impact on the lives and welfare of Palestinians and increase their dependence on humanitarian assistance. The position of the United Nations remains that the Government of Israel must take immediate steps to cease demolitions and evictions in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem,” Mr. Gaylard said.
Ends.


For further details please contact:
Richard Miron Mobile: 0545627825 Email: mironr@un.org


For Israel, conquered territory is conquered territory and it's all theirs to do with as they will.

To the "international community" (except the USA), it's occupied territory, and the people of the land have the right of return (and the occupiers must leave). Except in Isr/Pal. This condition there has festered for decades. It is still unresolved, by the wishes of Israel and the ("powerful") USA.

Because we squander or misuse "power", US "power" is slowly diminishing,
in Isr/:Pal (where Isr has all the power, we exercise none),
in the ME (among the 22 Arabs states, who are in collusion with Isr/US [we're buying them off),
and in the world (who look on with amazement at how the Israeli tail is leading the Dog in the race.

And all of this continues, year after dreary year. Nothing changes.

Or so most think. The majority are wrong.

There was no room for another family one night, as on this night many years go, when a Child was born in a livestock stall. Lowly, gentle, easy to ignore or despise, powerless. But He turned out to be truthful. And persistent. Single-minded. Loving. Not out for himself, non-manipulative, giving, caring. Especially for the marginalized, the outcast, those who had none to speak up for them. He came to his own, showing them, demonstrating for them, The Way.

His own refused to accept or believe in him or walk in his Way.

But to those who did, he gave them the right to be called "children of God". Born, not of human intention, but "of the Spirit of God".

A community of believers continues to live out of this Man's energy, cast his vision and live his ethic. And here is his way of of "ruling": Speaking truth to power, loving in persistent, strong, unflinching ways, serving persons in need, knowing the heart of God, and that "peace on earth, good will to mortals" is the final goal of heaven and earth; and actually bringing peace, reconciliation between enemies, through costly forgiveness.

Peace was achieved, between heaven and earth. Peace is being achieved. Peace will be achieved. Not a slogan to be bandied about, manipulated and crumpled like torn currency and burned in an incinerater, but person to person, flesh on flesh, one relationship at a time, until those at the "top" can no longer ignore what's happening.

It is this hope that pulls us forward, through the dark night when it appears the Dawn will never break, ever. But morning breaks and the Morning Star heralds the coming dawn. The dawn cannot be kept back. It has dawned. It is dawning. It will dawn.

Blessed are the peacemakers. They will be called the children of God.

With Christ-mas blessing to YOU. JRK

The Complete Text of Patrick Seale's Address to the British Academy

Dear Friend,
Just previously, I published (here) sections 11 and 12 of Patrick Seale's address to the British Academy. What follows is the complete text (again, thank you to Stephen Sizer, for bringing it to our attention). JRK

It is the text of a speech, entitled "America's War Against Islam", delivered last month at the British Academy by the distinguished British scholar/author/journalist Patrick Seale.

It addresses implicitly the old American question "Why do they hate us?"
It also answers the well-circulated folly that America is only pursuing its 'strategic resources.'
While it is reasonably lengthy, it is well worth finding the time to read. It was delivered on 18 November 2010



America’s War Against Islam
By Patrick Seale



1

It must now be clear to everyone that President Barack Obama has failed to keep his promise to the Muslim world. In Cairo last year, and on subsequent occasions, he pledged that the United States was not, and would never be, at war with Islam. These words awakened immense hope throughout the Muslim world, but that hope has now given way to an equally immense disillusion. Most Muslims see little difference between Obama and his belligerent predecessor, George W Bush. For them, America is at war with Islam.



And some of them intend to fight back.



There is an element of perplexing ambiguity about President Obama. He sends mixed signals. According to one view – a view I myself have held for some time -- he is a man of the Third World. His father was a Muslim. He spent some early years in Indonesia. He is the first black President of the United States. Everything about this background would suggest that he knows what needs to be done to defuse Muslim hostility and protect Western and American vital interests.



But there is another view of him, which has come to the fore, namely that he is really an all-American boy, who grew up in Hawaii, went to Harvard and then to Chicago, a very American town, and that he simply doesn’t really understand why Muslims are angry.



Obama may prefer America not to be at war with Islam, but he has done nothing about it except to utter a few emollient words – such as his speech a week or two ago in Jakarta -- as if Muslim hostility to the United States were only an unfortunate misunderstanding to be lifted by a little good will.



Instead of acting resolutely to defuse Muslim anger, he has placed himself in the hands of the very same people who have been making America’s disastrous Middle East policy under both parties for the past several decades. He has bowed to domestic pressures from powerful pro-Israeli lobbies and their affiliated think-tanks, from the US Congress, from a phalanx of Neo-conservatives whose influence still reaches deep inside the Administration, from the higher ranks of the U.S. military, from hectoring TV channels such as Fox News, and from an ignorant and increasingly right-wing and Islamophobic American public, still demanding vengeance for the attacks on the American heartland of 11 September 2001.



As America wages war against Islam more ferociously than ever, so the threat of attack from radical Islamic groups has grown rather than retreated under Obama’s Presidency.



2



At the start of his mandate, Obama outlined three clear goals: to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict on the basis of a two-state solution; to resolve by negotiation America’s conflict with Iran over its Nuclear programme; and to withdraw from Iraq. On the first count, he has been defeated by Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. On the second, he was deflected from his goal of reaching out to Iran by the ‘Green revolution’ which erupted last year following President Mahmud Ahmadinijad's rigged re-election.



Be that as it may, gone today is any real attempt at reconciliation with Tehran. Instead, Obama has resorted to increasingly punitive sanctions. He may have thought this was the only way to tame the hawks, both American and Israeli, who clamoured for military action. But cranking up sanctions has caused great bitterness in Tehran, where the United States is seen more than ever as the enemy. This is hardly the right climate for reaching a reasonable compromise on the Nuclear issue.



On Iraq, Obama has so far kept his pledge: 90,000 combat soldiers have left the country. But the United States has far from disengaged. 50,000 US soldiers remain in Iraq. And the vast fortified US embassy – the biggest in the world – bears witness to America’s ambitions in that country. Meanwhile, the situation remains highly dangerous and unstable. ‘Al-Qaida in Iraq’ has sprung menacingly to life – as was brought home by the recent grisly slaughter of Christian worshippers in the Syriac Catholic Cathedral in Baghdad.



3



Just who started the war between the United States and Islam is not my concern here. To answer that, one would have to examine the way the United States, after World War Two, inherited a neo-imperial role in the Middle East from its enfeebled European allies, Britain and France – who themselves laid the foundations for many of today’s conflicts by the way they chopped up and disposed of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire after World War One, including, of course, Britain’s support for Zionist aims in Palestine.



My concern is to try and understand the present situation – a situation in which a number of radical Islamic groups have struck at American and European targets, and have threatened to strike again. Although ten years have passed, the 11 September 2001 attacks on New York and Washington are still in everyone’s mind. But there have been several others: the earlier attack on the World Trade Centre in 1993; the assault on two of America’s East African embassies in 1998 which killed over 200 people; the suicide bombing of the USS Cole in Aden harbour in 2000 which killed 17 US sailors; the attack on a train in Madrid in March 2004 which killed 191 people, the suicide bombings in London’s transport system in July 2005 when 52 people died. Other, potentially devastating, attacks – such as the packages of explosives recently sent from Yemen -- have fortunately been foiled.



Western security chiefs --Jonathan Evans, head of Britain’s MI5, and Bernard Squarcini, his French opposite number -- have drawn particular attention to the danger posed by British-French-or American-born youths who, having been radicalised by action in Yemen or Somalia, might seek on their return to strike at Europe or the United States.



Some would argue that terrorist threats such as these can best be dealt with by police and intelligence services, by electronic intercepts, by counter-terrorist operations and surgical strikes. Clearly, Western security agencies are now on high alert, while the CIA is waging a shadow war against extremists in a dozen countries – in the mountains of Pakistan and the deserts of the Sahara, in Somalia and East Africa, in Central Asia and increasingly in Yemen.



The key question, it seems to me, is this: are such methods sufficient on their own to deal with the threat or is a fundamental revision required of current Western policies? Hostility to the West has spread far beyond the confines of small militant groups, such as al-Qaida. Indeed, most Muslims would probably reject Al-Qaida’s violent methods, but this does not mean that they are not stirred by anger and humiliation at America’s wars against Muslim countries, at the situation in Palestine, at the insulting way Muslims and their religion are treated in the West.



We are witnessing, if not yet a global insurgency, then something like a world-wide movement of Islamic resistance. Potential recruits for Jihad are legion.



4



Why has the West -- and the U.S. in particular -- aroused such hatred in the Muslim world? At the risk of over-simplifying a complex subject, I would suggest at least three main reasons.



The first is what one might call the militarisation of America’s foreign policy. US forces are now deployed in about a thousand bases, stations and outposts throughout the world – including several in the Arab and Muslim world, where the most violent confrontations are taking place. America’s 2010 military budget runs to the titanic figure of over $700bn – more than the defence budgets of the whole of the rest of the world combined.



Washington seems to have assumed a God-given right to interfere forcibly in the affairs of other nations. It has waged wars and destroyed whole societies – allegedly in the interest of liberating them from local tyrants or of introducing them to the benefits of Western-style democracy. Any country daring to defy the United States is dubbed a ‘rogue state’. In the last two or three decades, America’s national triumphalism has turned into a project to control the world through the expansion of American military power.



This is a theme explored by the distinguished American commentator William Pfaff in a brilliant essay, The Irony of Manifest Destiny, published earlier this year. Pfaff explains how America’s dominant political ideology -- its confidence in the superiority of its democracy, of its institutions, of its values – has in recent years been recast into a policy of aggressive international intervention -- even, when necessary, of military pre-emption. The enemy is defined as Islamic radicalism.



In his second inaugural address, George W Bush went so far as to say that America’s mission was nothing less than ‘to abolish evil in the world’ -- ‘evil’ defined as Islamic militancy! Bush’s Global War On Terror – or GWOT – was the clearest example of this aggressive forward policy. As a consequence, American military operations killed -- and are killing -- large numbers of Muslims in many parts of the globe, arousing great anger. Many Muslims have come to see America as a destroyer rather than a liberator.



The US never paused to ask itself why it was attacked on 11 September 2001, why educated young Muslims like Muhammad Ata were ready to sacrifice their lives in order to strike at America. The US response to 9/11 could, and perhaps should, have been a police or special-forces operation to find Bin Laden and his associates. Instead, George W Bush invaded Afghanistan in 2001 and overthrew the Taliban government to punish it for giving house-room to al-Qaida’s leadership, little aware that the Pashtun tribal code demands that hospitality and protection be afforded to strangers. Rather than adopting a policy which might have separated the Pashtun tribesmen from their dangerous guests, Bush’s invasion -- and the on-going nine-year war that has followed -- have cemented the alliance between the Taliban and al-Qaida in the common goal of expelling foreign forces.



Obama may have dropped the GWOT catch-phrase, but the unfortunate reality is that far from scaling back the war against Islamic militants he has expanded it. His many military operations have widened the circle of America’s enemies.



Is it surprising that many Muslims consider that America is at war with Islam?



5



Let me turn to another major reason for Muslim and Arab hostility to the United States. It is the unlimited backing which America has given Israel over more than forty years -- and continues to give today with ever more lavish generosity. The massive flow of aid – military, financial and political – reflects the very great influence which Israel and its American friends have secured over America’s Middle East policy.



An extraordinary recent example was the letter Dennis Ross, a well-known advocate of Israel inside the Administration, drafted for Obama to send to Israel’s Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu to persuade him to extend the partial Settlement freeze in the Occupied Territories. Ross’s draft has aroused anger and incredulity in the Arab and Muslim world. In exchange for a mere 60-day extension of the very partial freeze, Ross proposed that Obama offer Israel a pledge not to ask for any further extensions after this one; an increase in military aid (over and above the more than $3.2bn Israel is getting this year); support for Israel’s bid to remain in the Jordan Valley (which makes nonsense of any idea of a viable Palestinian state); a pledge to veto any Security Council resolutions hostile to Israel during the first year of negotiations, and more in the same vein. Even the New York Times, not known for its criticism of Israel, called the package ‘overly generous.’ Netanyahu turned down the offer. He obviously thought he could get more – and he succeeded! In a seven-hour bargaining session with Secretary of State Hilary Clinton he secured an even more generous security and diplomatic package: another squadron of F-35s worth $3bn; a US pledge to veto any attempt to win recognition of a Palestinian State at the UN Security Council and much more, against an extension of the partial freeze from 60 to 90 days (excluding East Jerusalem.)



As Geoffrey Aronson of the Foundation for Middle East Peace commented: In return for a temporary tactical concession by Netanyahu, Obama appears ready to provide wide-ranging American territorial and security assurances that have a direct bearing on the shape of a final status agreement.



America’s extravagant commitments to Israel were first made by Henry Kissinger in the 1970s. As President Nixon sank into the Watergate scandal, Kissinger rose to become the tsar of Washington’s diplomacy, with almost presidential powers. To win support from leading members of the Administration whose commitment to Israel was less fervent than his own, Kissinger portrayed Israel as an American strategic asset in the global struggle against the Soviet Union. The figures are eloquent. In 1970, Israel received a mere $30 million in US credits and arms deliveries; in 1971, after the ‘Black September‘ crisis in Jordan in which Kissinger called on Israel to help protect King Hussein, US aid rose to $545 million. And during the October War of 1973, Kissinger called for a $3 billion aid bill. It has remained at about that level ever since. A major landmark on the road to America’s alignment with Israel was the promise Kissinger made that the US would make no move in the Middle East Peace Process without first consulting Israel.



Even more far reaching was the subsequent US commitment to guarantee Israel’s military superiority over all its neighbours, its so-called Qualitative Military Edge -- or QME. The US has honoured this guarantee for the past 30 years. What is more, the guarantee was written into US law in 2008 and is therefore binding on this and every future President.



The QME is defined as an American guarantee to ensure Israel’s ability to counter and defeat any military threat from any state, coalition of states or non-state actors, while itself sustaining minimal casualties or damage.



Last July, Andrew J Shapiro, Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs at the State Department and a well-known pro-Israeli hawk, told an audience at Washington’s Saban Centre that a prime responsibility of his job was to preserve Israel’s QME. This involved the unprecedented commitment, made in 2007, to provide Israel with $30bn in security assistance over ten years, together with an extra $205m this year, over and above the $3bn, to help finance Israel’s new ‘Iron Dome’ multi-layered defence system designed to neutralise Hizballah’s short-range rockets. The US has worked to shut down the flow of weapons into Gaza, to mop up so-called ‘terrorist’ financing, to protect Israel’s Nuclear monopoly. The US maintains a War Reserve Stockpile in Israel, which the IDF can draw on in an emergency, and has given Israel access to millions of dollars each year in free or discounted military equipment under the Defence Department’s Excess Defence Articles programme. Shapiro himself is the US representative on the US-Israel Joint Political-Military Group which ensures the closest defence ties between the two allies.



Meanwhile, another pro-Israeli hawk, Stuart Levey, Under-Secretary at the US Treasury, is eagerly and relentlessly putting the squeeze on Iran. His aim (in his own words) is ‘dramatically to isolate Iran financially and commercially’ from the rest of the world.



The US has, in fact, embraced as its own Israel’s security doctrine, first elaborated by David Ben Gurion sixty years ago. This doctrine holds that Israel’s security can be guaranteed only by military supremacy over the entire region. Israel must be stronger than any possible combination of its neighbours. Ariel Sharon used to say that Israel’s sphere of influence extends as far as an F-15 can fly. This sphere will soon be extended since Israel is to get twenty F-35s, the very latest American warplane – paid for by the American tax-payer.



It is of course perfectly understandable and legitimate for Israel to seek maximum security for itself, and for the United States to help it to do so. That is not the issue. The problem with the QME is that it encourages Israel to over-reach. Israel demands security for itself but at the cost of the insecurity of its neighbours. These neighbours have no right to defend themselves, but must meekly submit to Israel’s American-guaranteed military supremacy. Anyone who dares resist is called a ‘terrorist!’



The QME does more than provide Israel with security. It gives it the power to strike its neighbours whenever they show defiance -- a power which has led to repeated wars, military incursions, massacres, and to a permanent state of nervous insecurity in the region, such as we are witnessing today. The QME has also allowed Israel to expand at the expense of its neighbours. The US is thus complicit in Israel’s prolonged occupation of the Syrian Golan and in the relentless seizure of Palestinian land by fanatical Jewish settlers and Greater Israel ideologues.



To an outside observer, it would seem that the United States has allowed the relationship with Israel to get out of hand.



There is another aspect of Israeli policy which arouses great anger – that is, its systematic attempts to penetrate, disrupt and enfeeble its Arab neighbours. Over the past several decades, Israel has incited the Kurds against Baghdad; the southern Sudanese against Khartoum; the Lebanese Maronites against Syria, to mention only some of its ventures. Israel has also frequently resorted to murdering suspected enemies both inside the Palestinian Territories and abroad – such as the killing of a Hamas official in a hotel in Dubai not so long ago. All these actions have contributed to a steady build-up of hostility to Israel and the United States—as well as to a growing determination to resist whatever the cost. One should not be surprised that crowds in many a Muslim city cry ‘Death to Israel!’ and ‘Death to America!’



6



A third reason for Muslim hostility to America and to the West in general is the virulent strain of Islamophobia that has broken surface in the U.S. and in several European countries. Now that Communism has collapsed, many Americans, and an increasing number of Europeans, choose to depict Islam as the ‘new enemy’. A chorus has arisen denigrating and demonising Islam as an irredeemably violent religion which must be defeated if the West and Israel are to be safe.



Inflammatory actions have contributed to poisoning the atmosphere – such as a readiness to burn the Qur’an, which Muslims consider the living word of God; vandalising Muslim cemeteries, as has happened in France; or the noisy demonstrations in Manhattan against the project to build an Islamic community centre, Cordoba House, three blocks from Ground Zero. Obama’s defence of the project prompted a reader of The Washington Post to say that this proved conclusively that the President was ‘neither an American nor a Christian.’ The Anti-Defamation League, the biggest Jewish American organisation engaged in the struggle against anti-Semitism, has come out strongly against the mosque project, as have Christian Zionists and the Baptist preacher Pat Robertson, honorary president of the Christian Coalition of America, who has repeatedly charged that Islam is a ‘satanic power’ which seeks to impose its law on Judeo-Christian civilization.



In these quarters, Obama’s pledge – which, alas, has proved empty -- that the US is not at war with Islam is seen as cowardly appeasement. Christopher Caldwell, a senior editor on the Weekly Standard, the main organ of Washington’s Neo-conservatives, scornfully dismissed Obama’s Cairo speech as ‘penitent, humbled and even sycophantic’. Its purpose, he asserted, was ‘to break faith with Israel’.



In Europe, the success of far-right parties – in Holland, Sweden, Denmark, Austria, Switzerland – has sent a clear signal to Muslim immigrants that they are not welcome. Germany, too, is in the grip of a great debate about whether or not its three million Turks can ever be fully integrated. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has herself admitted that multiculturalism has failed. In France, President Sarkozy has adopted a clear anti-Muslim policy: he has confronted Iran over its Nuclear programme; he has sent troops to fight in Afghanistan; he has strenuously opposed Turkish membership of the EU, apparently in the belief that there are more than enough Muslims in Europe already. He has also linked Muslim immigration to crime, and has launched a controversial debate about France’s ‘national identity’ – widely seen as an attempt to garner far right votes ahead of the 2012 presidential election.



Is it surprising that some Muslims feel that the West is at war with them?



7



There are, of course, many other reasons for the present Islamist ferment. All too often, Muslim militants are at war with their own governments as well as with the US -- for being enslaved, as they would see it, to Western powers; for failing to contain, let alone defeat, Israel over the past six decades; for endangering Muslim cultural identity. There is a widespread feeling among them that secular nationalism has failed to protect Muslim interests, that Arab Nationalism, in particular, is an empty slogan which has not resulted in any effective joint action, let alone Arab unity.



The jails of Egypt, Iraq, Algeria, Syria, Jordan, and Yemen are full of different varieties of rebellious Islamic militants. Saudi Arabia is perhaps the one Arab country to have launched a reasonably successful programme of re-education and rehabilitation for such extremists. But not all Saudi extremists have seen the light. The Kingdom remains al-Qaida’s number one target. All too often, Arab regimes have had to face the backlash from American military operations. When the US kills Muslims – in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen or wherever – it is the local rulers who lose legitimacy in the eyes of their own people.



8



Aggressive Western interventions in the affairs of the Muslim world have often had unintended and usually unwelcome consequences. Let me remind you of a few such cases.



The most familiar one is perhaps that of the covert Anglo-American coup in Iran in 1953, which overthrew Muhammad Mossadeq, the charismatic anti-colonial Prime Minister and passionate opponent of foreign intervention. Mosaddeq's crime was to attempt to nationalise the all-powerful Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. After his fall, the US lavished weapons on the Shah to build him up into a gendarme of Western interests in the Gulf and lent support to his so-called ‘white revolution’, which was largely directed against the Shi‘ite religious establishment.



Had Britain and the United States not overthrown Mossadeq, it is very probable that the 1979 revolution – in effect an Islamic counter-revolution -- would not have occurred. There would have been no virulently anti-American Islamic Republic of Iran. Washington’s breach with Tehran has now lasted more than 30 years.



Lebanon provides another example of unforeseen consequences. When the Israelis first invaded Lebanon in 1978, President Jimmy Carter ordered them out. They eventually complied, leaving a proxy Lebanese force behind. But in 1982, the then US Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, gave Israel a green light to invade Lebanon again. Its war aims were to destroy the PLO, expel Syrian influence and put an Israeli vassal in power in Beirut. Israeli forces laid siege to Beirut – killing some 17,000 people. The US then sought to reward Israel for its aggression by brokering a peace treaty between Lebanon and Israel -- the so-called 17 May 1983 accord -- which would have put Lebanon into Israel’s orbit. Syria mobilised its local allies and destroyed the accord. Unlike Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan then decided to ‘negotiate’ Israel out of Lebanon. It stayed for 18 years.



Hizballah, Lebanon’s Shi‘i resistance movement, was formed as a direct result of Israel’s repeated incursions, invasions, massacres and occupations. Although Israel and the United States persist in calling it a terrorist organisation, Hizballah’s mission is first of all to protect the Shi‘a community, which accounts for some 35 to 40 per cent of the population; secondly, to deter any further Israeli assaults such as its 2006 war, which was also sanctioned by Washington. That many Lebanese feel nothing but bitter, vengeful hostility to Israel and its US patron is not altogether surprising.



Another, rather less well-known, example of unforeseen consequences concerns Iraq. In the 1970s, shortly after clawing his way to the top as Iraq’s strong man, Saddam Hussein was confronted by a Kurdish rebellion, armed, encouraged and financed by the Shah of Iran, by Israel and the United States. To get these external actors to drop their support for the Kurds, Saddam agreed -- with great reluctance -- to put his signature to the Algiers Agreement of 1975, by which he surrendered to Iran control over half the Shatt al-Arab waterway up to the thalweg line, that is the deepest channel. Formed by the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates, the Shatt is the estuary which channels the waters of these two great rivers into the Gulf. It is Iraq’s only access to the sea. Before the Algiers Agreement, Iraq’s control of the Shatt extended to the Iranian shore.



Iraq’s loss of full control over the Shatt continued to rankle. In 1980, Saddam tore up the Algiers Agreement and went to war against the new-born Islamic Republic. The Iran-Iraq war lasted eight long years, 1980-88. It caused an estimated one million deaths and untold destruction on both sides. The US backed Iraq, opening a second front against Iran in the Gulf -- and even shooting down an Iranian civilian airliner. Israel did its best to keep the war going by selling arms clandestinely to Iran, thus breaching America’s embargo. (This was the so-called Iran-Contra affair).



The war ended when both sides were exhausted. But its unforeseen consequences are with us still. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran’s combative President, and the commanders of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, were shaped by the life-and-death struggle with Iraq. America is now confronted by men who bear an enormous, and some might say legitimate, grievance against it.



While the Iraq-Iran war was raging, another struggle was taking place in Afghanistan – this was the proxy war between the United States and the Soviet Union. It was to provide another notorious case of unforeseen consequences. With the help of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, the United States recruited, trained and armed tens of thousands of Muslim youths to fight the Soviets. These Mujahideen -- volunteer fighters in the cause of Islam -- were drawn from many countries. Over 25,000 came from Yemen, for example. Many came from Algeria and other places across the region. Their names and personal details were entered into the data-base of a fervent opponent of the Soviet military presence: Osama Bin Laden.



But, once the Soviets cut their losses and quit Afghanistan in 1989, the United States had no further use for the Mujahideen. Thoughtlessly, it dropped them. Funding dried up. Thousands of alienated and unemployed youth, often unwanted back in their own countries, turned against their former patrons. Some turned against Saudi Arabia, when it invited half a million US soldiers on to its territory in 1990 – a territory Muslims consider ‘sacred’ -- to expel Iraq from Kuwait. Many more former Mujahideen turned violently against America.



The creation of al-Qaida was thus a direct result of America’s mobilisation of the Mujahideen to destroy Soviet power in Afghanistan.



Saddam Hussein emerged from the Iraq-Iran with a grievance. Iraq had fought and bled to contain revolutionary Iran. In doing so, it had protected the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia, as well as Western oil interests. Not unnaturally, Saddam expected a reward. He wanted Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to write off his wartime debts. He felt that the Western powers should recognise him as their prime interlocutor in the Gulf. But instead of rewarding him, attempts were made to cut him down to size. Kuwait refused to write off his debts. Israel made threatening noises.



Saddam had long resented Iraq’s very narrow frontage on the Gulf, which made the country virtually land-locked. Britain had drawn the frontier in such a way as to prevent Iraq from interfering with the Gulf Sheikhdoms on Britain’s sea-route to India. Anyway, to compensate him for the narrow frontage, Saddam wanted Kuwait to give him, or lease him, two small uninhabited islands which obstruct Iraq’s access to the sea. But Kuwait refused. Saddam accused it of flooding the market with oil to force down the price and bankrupt him. Tension mounted between them. On 2 August 1990, an enraged Saddam invaded Kuwait.



The Invasion shocked Arab leaders and struck a blow at Arab solidarity. Saddam’s aggressive move aroused fears in the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia, and also in the West. Within six months, the US had put together a grand coalition, which included Britain and France, but also Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria. The campaign opened with an aerial bombardment followed by a ground assault. Iraqi forces were soon routed and Kuwait was liberated. This was the first Gulf War of 1991, also known as Operation Desert Storm.



But the war was far from popular with opinion across the Arab and Muslim world. Many sided with Iraq, and were even ready to fight for it. There was great anger at the way Saddam’s troops were savagely bombed as they fled Kuwait. The long punitive 13-year blockade of Iraq which followed seemed unnecessarily cruel and is said to have caused the death of half a million Iraqi babies.



In 1991, Yemen, for one, refused to join the anti-Iraq coalition. In retaliation, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States expelled about a million Yemeni workers. Remittances from these workers had been the mainstay of Yemen’s economy. Their loss crippled the country and is a major reason why Yemen is today a ‘failing state’ and a sanctuary for ‘al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula’.



There was yet another major unforeseen consequence of the Iran-Iraq war. Even though Iraq was gravely weakened by the 8-year struggle, Israel still viewed it as potentially dangerous. In an angry verbal exchange with Israel shortly after the war, Saddam was rash enough to declare that if Israel were to attack him he would ‘burn half of Israel.’ Unknowingly, he had signed his own death warrant.



From then on, Israeli strategists started to worry about a potentially hostile ‘Eastern front’, which might, they thought, take the form of an Iraqi thrust through Jordan. Israel had neutralised Egypt to the south by the 1979 peace treaty. But Iraq, to the east, was still on its feet. Throughout the 1990s, Israel and its Neo-conservative friends in the United States plotted, campaigned and pressured America to attack Iraq. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 gave them their chance.



In making the case for war, the role played by Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz and his colleague Douglas Feith at the Pentagon, and by David Wurmser, Louis ‘Scooter’ Libby and others in Vice President Cheney’s Office, has been well documented. They were among the most prominent of the large number of pro-Israeli Neocons deeply embedded in George W Bush’s Administration. Fraudulent intelligence was peddled to make the case that Saddam was linked to al-Qaida and was developing Weapons of Mass Destruction.



In order to persuade the US to attack Iraq in the aftermath of 9/11, the Neocons produced a self-serving explanation of Islamic terror. Such terror, they argued, had nothing to do with America’s armed interventions in the Muslim world and nothing to do with its lavish support for Israel. America was blameless. America was good. Islamic terror, they said, was the product of a violent and fanatical religion. For America and Israel to be safe, the Middle East had to be reformed and restructured – if necessary by force.



The US could begin by restructuring Iraq, and then move on to Syria, Iran, Lebanon, even in due course to Egypt and Saudi Arabia as well. The Neocons' dream was to harness American power to deal a terminal blow to Islamic Militancy, Arab Nationalism, and Palestinian Resistance.



The immediate aim of this geopolitical fantasy was nothing less than the disarmament of Iraq, Iran and Syria, and the destruction of Hizballah and Hamas, the two defiant non-state actors. The US was persuaded to shift its focus from Afghanistan to Iraq. The result was the 2003 Invasion and Occupation.



Pro-Israeli Neocons were, of course, not the only ones pressing for war against Iraq. After 9/11, George W Bush wanted to teach the Arabs a lesson they would never forget. Defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld felt the need for a small war to overcome opposition from the top brass to his plans to reshape the US military. He had his eye on a US strategic base in Iraq. Vice President Dick Cheney – who had spent five years at the head of the oil services giant Halliburton – imagined that Iraq’s oil could serve as a replacement for Saudi oil. US relations with Saudi Arabia were strained since fifteen of the twenty-one 9/11 hijackers were Saudi.



Be that as it may, without the intense pressure and manipulation of intelligence by the Neocons, America would not have gone to war. Wolfowitz and his friends insisted that the Iraqi Ba'ath Party be outlawed and the Iraq army disbanded, throwing 400,000 men on to the street. These happened to be the two institutions that kept the country together. The evident Neocon ambition was to weaken Iraq permanently by remaking it as loose federal state. They may well have succeeded. We shall have to see.



9



The Invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the long Occupation which followed must be counted among the great crimes of our time. A major Arab country was destroyed. The country’s infrastructure – the little that had survived 13 years of punitive sanctions – was shattered. A human tragedy of epic proportions was enacted. Hundreds of thousands died and millions more were forcibly displaced from their homes or fled abroad. The documents recently released by Wikileaks remind one of the horrors of the American Occupation – the torture, kidnappings and killings, the trigger-happy private contractors, the unpunished war crimes.



The war has had grave consequences, of which three are perhaps worth mentioning.



First, the destruction of Iraq overturned the regional balance. Without the counterweight of Iraq, Iran was able to emerge as the major power in the Gulf region. Today, it can no longer be ignored. To seek to isolate it, subvert it or strike at it, is to take grave risks. Such hostile actions will not easily be forgiven or forgotten.



Second, the war released sectarian demons in Iraq and across the region. It widened the ancient Shi‘a-Sunni split in the Muslim world, stoking particular fears in countries with large Shi‘a communities -- in Lebanon, Bahrain, Kuwait, Yemen and Saudi Arabia itself. It also aroused enmity between Muslims and Christians, since the latter are widely seen as friendly to the West. Iraqi Christians have been especially hard hit and have fled the country in large numbers.



Third, the United States has paid – and continues to pay -- a very heavy price in men and treasure. The full bill has yet to come it. The catastrophic Iraq war is said to have cost the American tax payer upwards of a trillion dollars! But there are less visible costs as well – the blow to America’s reputation, to its morale, to the fighting spirit of its troops.



Another cost is the immense Muslim fury against the United States and Israel aroused by the war and its aftermath. The unwelcome consequences of the Iraq war are likely to be with us for a very long time.



Allow me to say a brief word about Tony Blair’s role. As we all know, he is unrepentant. But he has not come clean about his real reasons for committing Britain to the war. It seems highly probable that he joined George Bush’s war because, unlike Jacques Chirac of France who openly opposed the war, he dared not put at risk Britain’s close security, defence and intelligence ties with the United States -- such as the world-wide sharing of signals intelligence under the UKUSA agreement; Britain’s participation in the development of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the American missiles on Britain’s Nuclear submarines, and much else besides. Once Blair decided that he had no option but to follow Bush’s lead, he also had no option but to fall in with the Neocons' analysis of the Iraqi threat, because the Neocons were dictating Middle East policy in Washington.



Blair has faced opprobrium for committing Britain to the Iraq war, but he has also been amply rewarded: last year Tel Aviv University gave him its Dan David prize, worth one million dollars, for what it described as his ‘exceptional leadership’, and last month the Washington Institute for Near Policy, a pillar with AIPAC of the pro-Israeli lobby, gave him its Scholar-Statesman award. It was an occasion at which he chose to parrot the line that an Iranian bomb was a threat to mankind and that Muslim ‘extremists’ challenged the values of the entire civilised world.



10



When Tony Blair was interviewed on French radio last September, I heard him say that if Iran got the bomb it would use it. This was highly irresponsible. Blair must surely know that Nuclear weapons are essentially defensive weapons. Their only real purpose is to deter a hostile attack. They have no offensive value unless linked to a secure second-strike capability, which Iran is very far indeed from having. Some time ago, Jacques Chirac punctured scare-mongering about Iran’s Nuclear ambitions by reminding everyone that Iran would be reduced to cinders in a flash, if it so much as attempted to launch a Nuclear-armed missile. Israel’s clamour about an ‘existential threat’ from Iran has no basis in truth, as its Defence Minister Ehud Barak has himself admitted.



What is true, however, is that if Iran were to acquire a Nuclear capability, or even if it were merely to reach the so-called threshold stage, this could curtail Israel’s freedom of action; it could limit its unfettered ability to bash its neighbours at will. I do not think Israel would have launched its destructive assaults on Lebanon in 2006 or on Gaza in 2008-9 – nor would it feel able openly and repeatedly to threaten Iran with attack -- if there were something like a balance of power in the region.



Israel is adamantly opposed to any of its neighbours acquiring a deterrent capability. It jealously guards its Nuclear monopoly precisely because it wants to be able to hit without being hit back. It is against any compromise which might allow Iran to continue enriching Uranium, even for civilian purposes. It wants Iran disarmed, just as Iraq was disarmed. It wants Hizballah and Hamas destroyed. Late last month Susan Rice, America’s UN Ambassador, railed against Iran and Syria for daring to arm Hizballah. Clearly, in American eyes, Israel’s neighbours have no right to defend themselves!



Fortunately, Catherine Ashton, the EU’s Foreign Affairs High Representative, has taken the initiative to convene Nuclear talks with Iran this December. Iran seems to have responded favourably, but it does not want to negotiate under threat of attack. President Ahmadinejad has said repeatedly that he favoured an agreement under which Iran would export some of its low-enriched Uranium to Turkey in return for Nuclear fuel for a civilian reactor in Tehran. Some months ago Turkey and Brazil reached an agreement with Iran on these lines which could have provided the basis for a comprehensive settlement. But Washington pooh-poohed it, and instead pressed for enhanced sanctions. Obama may have been persuaded that tougher sanctions on Iran might induce Israel to make concessions to the Palestinians. He must surely now be cured of such illusions.



The present clamour for war against Iran is nothing less than a scandal. The clamour comes from Prime Minister Netanyahu and other Israeli leaders, from a host of American politicians and Neo-conservatives – the same people who pushed for war against Iraq. John McCain’s advice to ‘bomb, bomb, bomb’ Iran has been taken up by William Kristol of the Weekly Standard, by Joseph Lieberman, an independent US Senator, by Howard Berman, Chairman of the House of Representatives’ Foreign Affairs Committee (shortly to be replaced by Eleana Ros-Lehtinen, who is even more fervently pro-Israeli than him), by John Vinocur, an influential pro-Israeli columnist on the International Herald Tribune, and by many others on both sides of the Atlantic. In an article on October 5, Vinocur scolded the Obama Administration for its lack of military determination. Israel, he wrote, ‘is very unlikely to wait for a less hesitant US policy on Tehran’s Nuclear ambitions.’ It will not shy from ‘a determined response, if its own red lines are crossed by the Mullahs.’ Benny Morris, an Israeli ‘New Historian’ tuned fervent right-wing nationalist, has urged Israeli leaders to nuke Iran (according to Yossi Melman, Haaretz, 7 October 2010.)



We don’t know if Iran is seeking to acquire a Nuclear weapon. It has denied it. But we need to remember that Nuclear proliferation and Nuclear disarmament are two sides of the same coin. So long as Israel refuses to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or submit to IAEA inspections, Iran will press ahead with its Nuclear programme. The more Israel and its American friends beat the drums of war, the more Iran will seek to acquire a deterrent. Not to do so would indeed be foolhardy.



Which is the rogue Nuclear state? Iran which has never attacked anyone and possesses no Nuclear weapons, or Israel which has repeatedly attacked its neighbours, which occupies, oppresses and steadily dispossesses the Palestinians, and which has a large Nuclear arsenal? What if Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman had his finger on the Nuclear trigger? Could one still say that Israel was a responsible Nuclear power? Wasn’t he the man who suggested bombing Egypt’s Aswan Dam?



11



It is the greatest pity that Obama did not seize the opportunity of his triumphant election two years ago to announce a withdrawal from Afghanistan as well as from Iraq. Instead -- evidently not wanting to be portrayed as a wimp -- he declared that the war in Afghanistan was a ‘necessary’ war, necessary for the struggle against al-Qaida. This was probably his greatest single mistake. Following his election, he should have called at once for a tribal council, or Loya Jirga, of Afghanistan’s chieftains to discuss peace. He should have declared an immediate ceasefire, rallied Afghanistan’s neighbours to support a settlement, promised massive development aid and ordered as early a withdrawal as possible of US forces. He should indeed have followed his own instinct and not agreed to a military surge. But, as Bob Woodward relates in his latest book, Obama was defeated by his own military. The war has since spread to Pakistan, with potentially very unpleasant consequences for all concerned.



There is now talk at last of negotiations with the Taliban. President Hamid Karzai says he has been in contact with Taliban leaders, although we don’t yet know at what level. He has named 68 top religious, ethnic and faction leaders to a High Peace Council, and given them authority to conduct talks. He is evidently seeking his own way out of the war. However, Robert Gates, the US Defence Secretary, still says that the Taliban must be defeated, or at least held in check, before high level talks can proceed. His policy seems to be: Kill them first, and talk to them afterwards! This is not a policy likely to bring them to the table.



Ahmad Rashid, one of the best experts on Afghanistan, wrote in the Financial Times on October 6 that: ‘There are compelling reasons why the West – unless prepared to countenance another 5 to 10 years in Afghanistan – needs to start negotiations with the Taliban. The first thing Mr Obama needs to do ...is to push aside the military pundits and base his decisions on realities on the ground...’



John Chipman, head of the fairly hawkish London-based International Institute of Strategic Studies, believes that the Afghan Taliban pose no external threat to the West. In a recent article, he wrote: ‘The present counterinsurgency strategy is too ambitious, too draining and out of proportion to the threat. An effective containment and deterrence strategy could ensure that the Taliban did not invite al-Qaida back in when western forces withdraw.’ (International Herald Tribune 11-12 September 2010.)



There are some 40 million Pashtun tribesmen in Afghanistan. They provide the backbone of the Taliban. Tribal, fervently Muslim and xenophobic, they are determined to protect their traditions, their religion and their homeland. They have rarely, if ever, been conquered. Their age-old impulse is to resist foreign occupation. They should be left alone to find their own way to modernity. (Anecdote)



The CIA’s greatly increased use of drones to kills militants in the north-west of Pakistan is, in my view, a serious mistake. Has the insurgency been tamed by such strikes? What if Bin Laden himself were killed by a drone? Would that end the insurgency or, on the contrary, provoke it to greater militancy? This year, missile strikes have killed several hundred militants as well as some of their leaders. But such strikes inevitably cause civilian deaths as well and arouse violent anti-American feeling.



The United States has long been pressuring Pakistan to make war on militants in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Some months ago Pakistan was persuaded to launch a military operation against Swat. The result was calamitous. Very large numbers of innocent people were displaced from their homes. The militants have been provoked to hit back. Pakistan has suffered three years of virtually non-stop suicide bombings and has been gravely destabilised. Its leaders have lost legitimacy. Undaunted, the US is now pressing Pakistan to attack North Waziristan as well. General David Petraeus has even issued veiled warnings to top Pakistan commanders that, if Pakistan did not do so, the US could itself launch ground operations in North Waziristan. This is sheer folly.



Over the past nine years, the US has spent over $350 billion on the war in Afghanistan. This year alone some 600 soldiers of the international force have been killed. For what noble cause have these young men died? Seeking to impose a Western model of society on Afghanistan is a doomed enterprise.



12

What needs to be done?



May I end by making some policy recommendations, which many might consider utopian.



First, America and its allies should stop killing Muslims! They should end their military interventions in Muslim countries and adopt a policy of containment (as George Kennan once recommended for dealing with the Soviet Union). Does the US really need vast military bases in the Gulf? Would not an ‘over the horizon’ presence be less provocative and as effective?



In seeking an end to the Afghan conflict, the help of major states in the region should urgently be sought –Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, China, all have an interest in Afghan stability. In view of its widely different regions and ethnicities, a more decentralised form of government might suit Afghanistan best. The US should allow the Afghans to choose their own form of government and it should forget about exporting Western-style democracy.



Afghanistan is said to be rich in mineral resources. China will snap them all up unless the West withdraws its forces rapidly and seeks to repair the ravages of war with massive economic aid. Prosperity could bring peace.



Yemen has been much in the news. The US has opened a new war-front in that country – with drone attacks and operations by Special Forces. Washington has agreed to provide Yemen with some $50m a year in development aid, but is now said to be considering giving it $1.2 billion in military assistance -- to fight al-Qaida. The figures should be reversed. Yemen needs economic aid far more than guns. Yemen is a poor country. It is very short of drinking water. Its water table and its oil output are both falling. Hunger is a major problem. It faces a rebellion in the north, a secessionist movement in the south, as well as al-Qaida militants, inflamed against the government and its Western backers. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Yemen also gives asylum to close to 170,000 registered Somali refugees fleeing the violence in their own country. Yemeni sources say the number of Somali and Ethiopian migrants is closer to one million. About 3,000 wretched Somalis drown each year trying to reach the Yemeni shore. Economic development may be the only way to rob ‘Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula’ of its local support.



Another Al-Qaida franchise – ‘Al-Qaida au Maghreb Islamique’– or AQMI -- operates in a vast, poverty-stricken zone of the Sahel comprising parts of Mauretania, Mali, Niger and southern Algeria, where memories of French Colonialism are still fresh. In the past two years, AQMI has kidnapped 20 Westerners including, most recently, five French people seized last September from the Uranium mining town of Arlit in northern Niger. AQMI has branded President Nicolas Sarkozy an enemy of Allah. It wants him to withdraw French troops from Afghanistan and rescind the ban on the Burqa, the full face veil.



Niger, Mali and Mauretania are all in dire need of a major international effort to relieve poverty, hunger and desperate under-development. A large aid programme, rather than military operations, may be the best, perhaps the only way, to tame AQMI.



If putting an end to killing Muslims is one way to quell Muslim hostility, a second must surely be the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict – a conflict which has poisoned every political relationship in the region and especially the relationship between the West and Islam. A small fraction of the colossal sums spent on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan could have been used to compensate Palestinian refugees, pay Israeli settlers to return to Israel and spread prosperity and peace throughout the Middle East.



Instead of guaranteeing Israel’s military supremacy, the US should promote the emergence of a regional balance of power. History shows that a balance of power keeps the peace, whereas an imbalance causes war, as the stronger party will always seek to impose its will by force. Instead of security for Israel alone, the aim should be security for all.



If the US is crippled by domestic constraints, other states must have the courage to act -- and why not Britain in the lead since it bears a historic responsibility for the problem? Britain, some of its European partners and Russia, together with other members of the International Community, should use their muscle in insisting on a global settlement, involving Syria and Lebanon as well as the Palestinians. There is no reason why Israel should not face sanctions to persuade it to withdraw from the Golan, dismantle its illegal West Bank Settlements, and allow the birth of a Palestinian State. That would go a very long way to defusing Islamic anger and restoring the West’s battered reputation.



Israel’s present behaviour is far more damaging to Western interests and security than anything Iran is doing. If the Greater Israel project is not checked, the West will pay a very heavy price. Muslim rage will not easily be contained. It is safe to predict that an unprecedented tragedy will befall the whole region, from which the Arabs, Israel and its Western backers will not escape.



Some far-sighted Israelis are aware that their country is on a dangerous course -- a concern which seems to be shared by many American Jews. They are alarmed at the racist and fascistic trends in Israeli society as well as the cruel behaviour of the IDF, which have badly damaged Israel’s image.



At the same time, in spite of America’s massive help, Israel’s strategic environment is deteriorating. A Tehran-Damascus-Hizballah axis is challenging the regional hegemony of both Israel and its American ally. Hizballah’s asymmetric warfare forced Israel out of south Lebanon in 2000 after an 18-year stay. In a bid to destroy the movement, Israel invaded Lebanon yet again in 2006. It failed to achieve its goal, but it killed some fifteen hundred Lebanese. In like manner, Israel attacked Gaza in 2008-9, but failed to destroy Hamas. Some fourteen hundred Palestinians died. Having lost Iran thirty years ago, Israel is now in danger of losing Turkey, two countries which were once its major regional allies. Clearly, its security doctrine needs rethinking.



Yet Israel still insists on military supremacy. As has often been said, peace with its neighbours and integration into the region would be a far better recipe for its long-term security. The Arab Peace Initiative is still on the table. It offers Israel recognition and normal relations with all 22 members of the Arab League, indeed with all 59 Muslim-majority countries. In return, Israel would have to withdraw to the 1967 borders and allow the establishment of a viable Palestinian state. The real challenge for Israel is to know when and where to stop. Hubris, if unchecked, can lead to nemesis.



The modern state of Iran, heir to an ancient civilization, needs to be treated with the respect it deserves as a major regional power of 70 million inhabitants. Its right to the peaceful enrichment of Uranium should be recognised. The military option should be taken off the table, once and for all. The US should issue a public warning to Israel not to consider military action. In return, Iran should sign the additional protocol of the NPT, and allow intensive inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency.



An Israeli or American attack on Iran would be catastrophic for Western interests and for the vulnerable Gulf States -- the one Arab pole of prosperity and development, which would find itself in the line of fire.



Instead of seeking to isolate it, Iran should be drawn into the security architecture of the Gulf region. Instead of attempting to mobilise the Arabs against Iran, the Arab Gulf States should be encouraged to conclude a security pact with the Islamic Republic. Both Qatar and Oman have friendly relations with Iran. Others should follow their example. The basis of a security pact exists: Iran could pledge not to use Shi‘ite communities to undermine the political order in the Gulf, while the Gulf States could pledge not to allow their territories to be used for an attack on Iran.



Iranian society is in a highly delicate state. The regime is being challenged by the professional middle classes and by a rising generation of educated young people. More than two million Iranians are at university. After thirty years of the Islamic Republic, many Iranians are eager for a different, less theocratic model of society. The West would be wise to allow the process of change to take its course without external intervention.



The West should also recognise the vital role Turkey can play in resolving regional conflicts. It may be the one country which, if given the right support and encouragement, could defuse the dangerous crises in both Iran and Afghanistan and help draw the poison from the Arab-Israeli conflict. The US is making a vast mistake in allowing Turkey’s strained relations with Israel to influence its own attitude towards Turkey.



Evidently, there is an urgent need to end the war between Islam and the West. In dealing with Terrorism, police and counter-terrorist methods are obviously necessary, but they are not sufficient. The flow of angry recruits into militant organisations must be staunched. The only way to do so is to bring about a radical change in Western policies and attitudes towards the Arab and Muslim world and its conflicts.



Is there a realistic chance of any of this happening any time soon? I must admit that I don’t think so. Obama has been weakened; Europe remains divided; Israel is unrelenting; Islamophobia is on the upswing. It looks as if the struggle will continue. We may indeed have to expect further calamities.



End

Patrick Seale

(from: English Wikipedia)



Patrick Abram Seale is a British journalist and author who specialises in the Middle East, as well as a literary agent and art dealer. He is a former correspondent for The Observer and has interviewed many of the Middle East's most prominent leaders and personalities.



Seale is the author of a number of books, including The Struggle for Syria (1965), French Revolution 1968 (1968), Philby, the Long Road to Moscow (1973), The Hilton Assignment (1973), Assad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East (1988), Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire (1992), and The Struggle for Arab Independence: Riad el-Solh and the Makers of the Modern Middle East (2010). He also ghost-wrote Desert Warrior, the 1995 Gulf War memoirs of Saudi prince Khaled bin Sultan bin Abdul-Aziz.



Background

Seale's father was the Arabist and Theologian Morris S. Seale (1896-1993). He was educated at Balliol and St Antony's College, Oxford, where he specialised in Middle East history. He obtained his D.Litt at Oxford. His journalistic experience includes six years with Reuters, mainly as a financial journalist, and over twelve with The Observer, covering the Middle East, Africa, and India.



Career

Based in France, Seale is syndicated by Agence Global.[1] His columns appear in most major newspapers around the world, and are carried weekly by several newspapers, including Al-Hayat (London), Al-Ittihad (Abu Dhabi), The Daily Star (Beirut), The Saudi Gazette (Jeddah) and Gulf News (Dubai).



Personal life

Seale is married to Rana Kabbani, the Syrian writer and daughter of former Syrian Ambassador to the United States, Sabah Kabbani. Seale's first wife, Lamorna Heath, had an affair during their marriage with British novelist Martin Amis, and became pregnant with a daughter, Delilah. Patrick Seale agreed to raise the girl as his own, and did so alone, after his wife, who had suffered from depression, committed suicide when Delilah was two. He told Delilah on her 18th birthday in 1995 that Amis, a writer she was studying for her A-levels, was in fact her biological father.[2]



Notes

1. Agence Global

2. O'Sullivan, Jack. Amis's paternal triangle, The Independent, June 21, 1996.

US Choices in the Middle East

Dear Friend of Israelis and Palestinians,

Stephen Sizer sent me/us an encylclopedic overview of US foreign policies in the Middle East by Patrick Seale, a UK journalist with long experience in the ME.

If you wish to read the whole thing, ask me for it and I'll send it. It is exhaustive, compelling, and comprehensive.

I'm sending the last paragraphs of his overview, and his suggestions for going forward.

First let me send you a few facts about the author, Patrick Seale. JRK

Patrick Abram Seale is a British journalist and author who specialises in the Middle East, as well as a literary agent and art dealer. He is a former correspondent for The Observer and has interviewed many of the Middle East's most prominent leaders and personalities.

Background

Seale's father was the Arabist and Theologian Morris S. Seale (1896-1993). He was educated at Balliol and St Antony's College, Oxford, where he specialised in Middle East history. He obtained his D.Litt at Oxford. His journalistic experience includes six years with Reuters, mainly as a financial journalist, and over twelve with The Observer, covering the Middle East, Africa, and India.

Career

Based in France, Seale is syndicated by Agence Global.[1] His columns appear in most major newspapers around the world, and are carried weekly by several newspapers, including Al-Hayat (London), Al-Ittihad (Abu Dhabi), The Daily Star (Beirut), The Saudi Gazette (Jeddah) and Gulf News (Dubai).

Here are Sections 11 and 12 of Seale's Overview (JRK)
It is the greatest pity that Obama did not seize the opportunity of his triumphant election two years ago to announce a withdrawal from Afghanistan as well as from Iraq. Instead -- evidently not wanting to be portrayed as a wimp -- he declared that the war in Afghanistan was a ‘necessary’ war, necessary for the struggle against al-Qaida. This was probably his greatest single mistake. Following his election, he should have called at once for a tribal council, or Loya Jirga, of Afghanistan’s chieftains to discuss peace. He should have declared an immediate ceasefire, rallied Afghanistan’s neighbours to support a settlement, promised massive development aid and ordered as early a withdrawal as possible of US forces. He should indeed have followed his own instinct and not agreed to a military surge. But, as Bob Woodward relates in his latest book, Obama was defeated by his own military. The war has since spread to Pakistan, with potentially very unpleasant consequences for all concerned.

There is now talk at last of negotiations with the Taliban. President Hamid Karzai says he has been in contact with Taliban leaders, although we don’t yet know at what level. He has named 68 top religious, ethnic and faction leaders to a High Peace Council, and given them authority to conduct talks. He is evidently seeking his own way out of the war. However, Robert Gates, the US Defence Secretary, still says that the Taliban must be defeated, or at least held in check, before high level talks can proceed. His policy seems to be: Kill them first, and talk to them afterwards! This is not a policy likely to bring them to the table.

Ahmad Rashid, one of the best experts on Afghanistan, wrote in the Financial Times on October 6 that: ‘There are compelling reasons why the West – unless prepared to countenance another 5 to 10 years in Afghanistan – needs to start negotiations with the Taliban. The first thing Mr Obama needs to do ...is to push aside the military pundits and base his decisions on realities on the ground...’

John Chipman, head of the fairly hawkish London-based International Institute of Strategic Studies, believes that the Afghan Taliban pose no external threat to the West. In a recent article, he wrote: ‘The present counterinsurgency strategy is too ambitious, too draining and out of proportion to the threat. An effective containment and deterrence strategy could ensure that the Taliban did not invite al-Qaida back in when western forces withdraw.’ (International Herald Tribune 11-12 September 2010.)

There are some 40 million Pashtun tribesmen in Afghanistan. They provide the backbone of the Taliban. Tribal, fervently Muslim and xenophobic, they are determined to protect their traditions, their religion and their homeland. They have rarely, if ever, been conquered. Their age-old impulse is to resist foreign occupation. They should be left alone to find their own way to modernity. (Anecdote)

The CIA’s greatly increased use of drones to kills militants in the north-west of Pakistan is, in my view, a serious mistake. Has the insurgency been tamed by such strikes? What if Bin Laden himself were killed by a drone? Would that end the insurgency or, on the contrary, provoke it to greater militancy? This year, missile strikes have killed several hundred militants as well as some of their leaders. But such strikes inevitably cause civilian deaths as well and arouse violent anti-American feeling.

The United States has long been pressuring Pakistan to make war on militants in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Some months ago Pakistan was persuaded to launch a military operation against Swat. The result was calamitous. Very large numbers of innocent people were displaced from their homes. The militants have been provoked to hit back. Pakistan has suffered three years of virtually non-stop suicide bombings and has been gravely destabilised. Its leaders have lost legitimacy. Undaunted, the US is now pressing Pakistan to attack North Waziristan as well. General David Petraeus has even issued veiled warnings to top Pakistan commanders that, if Pakistan did not do so, the US could itself launch ground operations in North Waziristan. This is sheer folly.

Over the past nine years, the US has spent over $350 billion on the war in Afghanistan. This year alone some 600 soldiers of the international force have been killed. For what noble cause have these young men died? Seeking to impose a Western model of society on Afghanistan is a doomed enterprise.

12

What needs to be done?

May I end by making some policy recommendations, which many might consider utopian.

First, America and its allies should stop killing Muslims! They should end their military interventions in Muslim countries and adopt a policy of containment (as George Kennan once recommended for dealing with the Soviet Union). Does the US really need vast military bases in the Gulf? Would not an ‘over the horizon’ presence be less provocative and as effective?

In seeking an end to the Afghan conflict, the help of major states in the region should urgently be sought –Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, China, all have an interest in Afghan stability. In view of its widely different regions and ethnicities, a more decentralised form of government might suit Afghanistan best. The US should allow the Afghans to choose their own form of government and it should forget about exporting Western-style democracy.

Afghanistan is said to be rich in mineral resources. China will snap them all up unless the West withdraws its forces rapidly and seeks to repair the ravages of war with massive economic aid. Prosperity could bring peace.

Yemen has been much in the news. The US has opened a new war-front in that country – with drone attacks and operations by Special Forces. Washington has agreed to provide Yemen with some $50m a year in development aid, but is now said to be considering giving it $1.2 billion in military assistance -- to fight al-Qaida. The figures should be reversed. Yemen needs economic aid far more than guns. Yemen is a poor country. It is very short of drinking water. Its water table and its oil output are both falling. Hunger is a major problem. It faces a rebellion in the north, a secessionist movement in the south, as well as al-Qaida militants, inflamed against the government and its Western backers. According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Yemen also gives asylum to close to 170,000 registered Somali refugees fleeing the violence in their own country. Yemeni sources say the number of Somali and Ethiopian migrants is closer to one million. About 3,000 wretched Somalis drown each year trying to reach the Yemeni shore. Economic development may be the only way to rob ‘Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula’ of its local support.

Another Al-Qaida franchise – ‘Al-Qaida au Maghreb Islamique’– or AQMI -- operates in a vast, poverty-stricken zone of the Sahel comprising parts of Mauretania, Mali, Niger and southern Algeria, where memories of French Colonialism are still fresh. In the past two years, AQMI has kidnapped 20 Westerners including, most recently, five French people seized last September from the Uranium mining town of Arlit in northern Niger. AQMI has branded President Nicolas Sarkozy an enemy of Allah. It wants him to withdraw French troops from Afghanistan and rescind the ban on the Burqa, the full face veil.

Niger, Mali and Mauretania are all in dire need of a major international effort to relieve poverty, hunger and desperate under-development. A large aid programme, rather than military operations, may be the best, perhaps the only way, to tame AQMI.

If putting an end to killing Muslims is one way to quell Muslim hostility, a second must surely be the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict – a conflict which has poisoned every political relationship in the region and especially the relationship between the West and Islam. A small fraction of the colossal sums spent on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan could have been used to compensate Palestinian refugees, pay Israeli settlers to return to Israel and spread prosperity and peace throughout the Middle East.

Instead of guaranteeing Israel’s military supremacy, the US should promote the emergence of a regional balance of power. History shows that a balance of power keeps the peace, whereas an imbalance causes war, as the stronger party will always seek to impose its will by force. Instead of security for Israel alone, the aim should be security for all.

If the US is crippled by domestic constraints, other states must have the courage to act -- and why not Britain in the lead since it bears a historic responsibility for the problem? Britain, some of its European partners and Russia, together with other members of the International Community, should use their muscle in insisting on a global settlement, involving Syria and Lebanon as well as the Palestinians. There is no reason why Israel should not face sanctions to persuade it to withdraw from the Golan, dismantle its illegal West Bank Settlements, and allow the birth of a Palestinian State. That would go a very long way to defusing Islamic anger and restoring the West’s battered reputation.

Israel’s present behaviour is far more damaging to Western interests and security than anything Iran is doing. If the Greater Israel project is not checked, the West will pay a very heavy price. Muslim rage will not easily be contained. It is safe to predict that an unprecedented tragedy will befall the whole region, from which the Arabs, Israel and its Western backers will not escape.

Some far-sighted Israelis are aware that their country is on a dangerous course -- a concern which seems to be shared by many American Jews. They are alarmed at the racist and fascistic trends in Israeli society as well as the cruel behaviour of the IDF, which have badly damaged Israel’s image.

At the same time, in spite of America’s massive help, Israel’s strategic environment is deteriorating. A Tehran-Damascus-Hizballah axis is challenging the regional hegemony of both Israel and its American ally. Hizballah’s asymmetric warfare forced Israel out of south Lebanon in 2000 after an 18-year stay. In a bid to destroy the movement, Israel invaded Lebanon yet again in 2006. It failed to achieve its goal, but it killed some fifteen hundred Lebanese. In like manner, Israel attacked Gaza in 2008-9, but failed to destroy Hamas. Some fourteen hundred Palestinians died. Having lost Iran thirty years ago, Israel is now in danger of losing Turkey, two countries which were once its major regional allies. Clearly, its security doctrine needs rethinking.

Yet Israel still insists on military supremacy. As has often been said, peace with its neighbours and integration into the region would be a far better recipe for its long-term security. The Arab Peace Initiative is still on the table. It offers Israel recognition and normal relations with all 22 members of the Arab League, indeed with all 59 Muslim-majority countries. In return, Israel would have to withdraw to the 1967 borders and allow the establishment of a viable Palestinian state. The real challenge for Israel is to know when and where to stop. Hubris, if unchecked, can lead to nemesis.

The modern state of Iran, heir to an ancient civilization, needs to be treated with the respect it deserves as a major regional power of 70 million inhabitants. Its right to the peaceful enrichment of Uranium should be recognised. The military option should be taken off the table, once and for all. The US should issue a public warning to Israel not to consider military action. In return, Iran should sign the additional protocol of the NPT, and allow intensive inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

An Israeli or American attack on Iran would be catastrophic for Western interests and for the vulnerable Gulf States -- the one Arab pole of prosperity and development, which would find itself in the line of fire.

Instead of seeking to isolate it, Iran should be drawn into the security architecture of the Gulf region. Instead of attempting to mobilise the Arabs against Iran, the Arab Gulf States should be encouraged to conclude a security pact with the Islamic Republic. Both Qatar and Oman have friendly relations with Iran. Others should follow their example. The basis of a security pact exists: Iran could pledge not to use Shi‘ite communities to undermine the political order in the Gulf, while the Gulf States could pledge not to allow their territories to be used for an attack on Iran.

Iranian society is in a highly delicate state. The regime is being challenged by the professional middle classes and by a rising generation of educated young people. More than two million Iranians are at university. After thirty years of the Islamic Republic, many Iranians are eager for a different, less theocratic model of society. The West would be wise to allow the process of change to take its course without external intervention.

The West should also recognise the vital role Turkey can play in resolving regional conflicts. It may be the one country which, if given the right support and encouragement, could defuse the dangerous crises in both Iran and Afghanistan and help draw the poison from the Arab-Israeli conflict. The US is making a vast mistake in allowing Turkey’s strained relations with Israel to influence its own attitude towards Turkey.

Evidently, there is an urgent need to end the war between Islam and the West. In dealing with Terrorism, police and counter-terrorist methods are obviously necessary, but they are not sufficient. The flow of angry recruits into militant organisations must be staunched. The only way to do so is to bring about a radical change in Western policies and attitudes towards the Arab and Muslim world and its conflicts.

Is there a realistic chance of any of this happening any time soon? I must admit that I don’t think so. Obama has been weakened; Europe remains divided; Israel is unrelenting; Islamophobia is on the upswing. It looks as if the struggle will continue. We may indeed have to expect further calamities.